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In support of this petition 
respondents submit the following brief 
argument with citation of authorities: 
1. THE VENDOR'S LIEN WAS KEPT ALIVE 
IN THE WURST ACTION. 
In the Court's opinion reference is 
made in the fourth paragraph to the action 
which the Polleis brought against the Wursts 
in which they attempted to collect the balance 
owing on the contract, whereas in the present 
action the Polleis are seeking foreclosure 
of the vendor's lien on the property, as 
to which the opinion observed: "a theory 
not asserted against the Wursts in the 
previous action. Nor did Polleis join 
the defendants Burger in the Wurst action 
by virtue of any such theory or caµse of-
action." 
Since the Wurst pleadings were 
not before the Court in connection with 
this argument but they were before the 
District court, that file has been requested 
-3-
and is now available to this Court as a 
matter of judicial notice. In the trial 
of the Burger action counsel for the Polleis 
asked the Court to take judicial notice 
of the file in the Wurst action which was 
case No. 166302. Counsel for the Burgers 
were asked if they had any objection and 
stated that they had "no objection." Thereupon 
the Court stated: "The Court will take 
judicial notice of the file referred to." 
(Tr. 43). The lis pendens filed in connection 
with the Wurst action was also offered 
in evidence and was made Exhibit 6 in the 
principal action (Tr. 44). As to the reason 
for these documents counsel stated: "I 
don't know there is any particular grounds 
made of the circumstances of this action. 
Under the pleadings I am not sure what 
they claim as to their grounds. of waiver, 
and that is why I am including this complaint, 
and the lis pendens." and thereafter no point 
I 
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was made of waiver and we assumed the matter 
was taken care of, except that it was revived 
by this Honorable Court in its opinion. 
Examination of that file discloses 
that in Paragraph 8 of the complaint the 
Polleis specifically pleaded that they 
had retained an interest as vendors "and 
are entitled to have a vendor's lien declared 
junior only to the first mortgage as security 
for the payment of the accruing installments." 
and in the stipulation for judgment in that 
action it was stipulated specifically that 
the judgment left open and unprejudiced 
the right of the plaintiffs against subsequent 
purchasers of the property in the event 
defendants failed to pay the judgment and 
also any rights which the subsequent purchasers 
might have against the Wursts if the Wursts 
failed to pay the judgment. We suggest 
that this is important not only as nega-
tiving the waiver, but as indicating that 
-5-
the Burgers might well have a cause of 
action against the Wursts for breach of 
warranty, or even for fraud which would 
survive bankruptcy, if the Wursts failed 
to pay the judgment. 
The notice of lis pendens which 
was filed with reference to action No. 
166302 and which is Exhibit 6 in the action 
at bar specifically stated that the Polleis 
claim "a vendor's lien for unpaid purchase 
price." 
And as further evidence that there 
was no waiver or abandonment insofar as 
the Burgers are concerned Exhibit 5 was 
put in evidence in the case at bar, which 
the Burgers acknowledged receiving (Tr. 
43, 54, 59) which letter was dated May 
12, 1966, only fourteen days after the 
warranty deed from Wursts to Burger by which 
the Wursts were advised, with certified mail 
-6-
copy to the Burgers, that unless the monthly 
payments were made the i9terest of the 
wursts (and the Burgers) in the property 
would be forfeited. 
2. A WARRANTY DEED ABSOLUTE IN 
TERMS DOES NOT PRECLUDE A VENDOR'S LIEN. 
The existence of a vendor's lien 
after giving a warranty deed is established 
by this court in McMurdie v. Chugg, et al., 
99 Utah 403, 107 P2d 163, 132 ALR 435. 
There Anderson, the vendor, agreed to sell 
to the Chuggs for $3,500.00 certain property. 
The Chuggs paid a part of the purchase 
price and gave notes for the balance, where-
upon Anderson executed a warranty deed 
in 1929. In 1933 the parties agreed that 
$440.00 was still due and the Chuggs then 
gave two unsecured promissory notes for 
$140.00 and $300.00 providing for attorneys 
fees upon collection action. Anderson 
died in 1939 and McMurdie was appointed 
-?-
administrator and brought the action. The 
plaintiff obtained judgment, but it was 
held that there was no vendor's lien. The 
plaintiff appealed contending that the 
vendor's lien persisted and was not cut 
off by the defendants' claim of homestead 
and had not been waived or abandoned. 
This court had before it first 
the question of the validity of a statute 
providing for execution of the purchase 
price against a homestead and secondly, 
"whether a seller retains his vendor's 
lien on land until he is fully paid even 
though he takes promissory notes in the 
of the unpaid purchase price." 
This court upheld the vendor's lien despite 
the giving of the notes, but held that 
the attorneys fees provided in the replacement 
notes were inferior to the claim of homestead, 
saying: 
"It is a well established 
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rule of law that a vendor 
does not waive his vendor's 
lien for the purchase price 
simply by taking the vendee's 
own personal note for the 
amount due. If the vendor 
accepts the obligation of a 
third party or if he expressly 
waives his lien, it may be 
extinguished, but the taking 
of the personal, unsecured 
promissory note of the buyer 
cannot be held to be a waiver 
of the lien." 
The court also relied on Harris v. Larsen, 
24 Utah 139, 66 Pac. 782, where acceptance 
of a number of hogs as a part of the purchase 
price was held not to extinguish or be 
a waiver of a vendor's lien. 
In the annotation at 132 ALR following 
the reprinting of the case appears 
this statement: 
"The general rule is that where 
a vendor of property takes no 
other form of security than 
the vendee's own note, bond, 
covenant, bill or other promise, 
as a recognition of the amount 
owing on the purchase price, 
his vendor's lien remains in 
full force, and is not waived or 
-9-
discharged, unless an intention 
to the contrary is expressed or 
clearly evidenced from the 
cumstances." 
The court cites Petrofesa v. 
D. & R.G.W.R. Co., 110 Utah 109, 169 P.2d 808 
as somehow indicating that a vendor's lien 
does not survive a warranty deed. It holds 
that a water right is an appurtenance and 
is conveyed by a statutory warranty deed. 
No vendor's lien was involved in that case 
and we respectfully submit that McMurdie 
expresses the law in Utah that the giving 
of a warranty deed does not preclude the 
existence of a vendor's lien. This rule 
is amply supported by the other cases cited 
herein. 
The court also refers to Peterson 
v. Carter, 11 Utah 2d 381, 359 P.2d 1055 
which was discussed by both appellants 
and respondents in their briefs. The Peterson 
case recognizes the existence of a vendor's 
-10-
lien following the giving of a warranty 
need, but goes off on the question of waiver 
and estoppel for the reason that the vendor 
handled the funds arising from the later 
sale of the properties involved and had 
ample opportunity to discharge the vendor's 
lien which it failed to do. The court 
concluded its opinion in Peterson by saying: 
"* * *it was plaintiffs' own 
failure to protect themselves, 
and that they had waived any 
claim to any real or illusory 
vendor's lien." 
3. THE POLLEIS DID NOT WAIVE THEIR 
VENDOR 1 S LIEN. 
There was no waiver by the Polleis 
in this case by abandonment of the vendor's 
lien in failing to mention it in the action 
brought against the Burgers, because the 
complaint there plainly recites the vendor's 
lien in paragraph 8. 
The intention of the Polleis to 
assert the vendor's lien was also plainly 
-11-
evidenced by Exhibit 6 which was a lis pendens 
claiming vendor's lien in the Wurst (or first) 
action. 
According to the authorities, 
agreeing that part of the purchase price 
would be paid by a mortgage on the property 
itself, is not a waiver of the vendor's 
lien as to the unpaid of the purchase 
price, which is admittedly inferior to 
the mortgage lien: 
"Where the vendee mortgages 
the property in order to 
obtain money for part payment 
of the price, of which the 
vendor had knowledge, such 
mortgage does not waive or 
destroy the vendor's implied 
lien, in the absence of con-
duct on the part of the vendor 
showing an intention otherwise 
* * *." 92 C.J.S., Vendor 
and Purchaser, § 409, page 
353. 
The note cites two Florida cases and an 
Indiana case and the supplemental annotations 
cite a North Dakota case. 
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In Koppinger v. Implement Dealers 
Insurance Co. (North Dakota 1963), 
122 N.W.2d 134, a vendor's lien was established 
by statute, with no reference to the giving 
of a deed, which was done. 
"The evidence shows that the 
Candees, with Koppinger's 
consent, executed a mortgage 
and obtained a loan of $2,700.00 
on the premises. It is argued 
that this act on the vendor's 
part constituted a waiver of 
the vendor's lien that completely 
extinguished it. This is clearly 
not the case. The effect of the 
consent was to waive the priority 
of the vendor's lien so that it 
became subject to the mortgage. 
It did not destroy the lien. * * * 
"At the time the sale was made, 
there remained of the purchase 
price the sum of $1,500.00 that 
the buyer was obligated to pay 
the vendor. This sum was 
unsecured and evidenced by the 
personal note of the buyer. Under 
the provisions of Section 35-20-01, 
N.D.C.C. the vendor had a statutory 
lien on the property sold for that 
amount. The lien was not extin-
guished by the mortgage given 
by the buyer with the consent 
of the vendor, although the 
-13-
priority of the lien was 
waived as to that mortgage." 
Pages 136, 137.' 
is a similar holding in Old First 
tional Bank & Trust Co. v. Scheuman, 13 
N.E.2d 551, 214 Ind. 652, 119 ALR 1165. 
In that case there was a contract for payment 
of the purchase price on a tract of land 
with provision for a mortgage following 
the giving of a deed which did not reserve 
a vendor's lien, and also with provision 
for outside security as to part of the 
debt as well as inclusion of some personal 
property with the real estate. The court 
carefully considered all of these as claimed 
waivers of the vendor's lien, noting that 
the burden was on the vendee to repel the 
presumption and held that the vendor's 
lien was not waived. At page 557 of 13 
N.E.2d the court considered the agreement 
to apply for a loan on the premises as 
to which it said: 
-14-
"But we do not think that this 
fact would amount to a waiver 
of the lien. There is no evi-
dence that any mortgage was 
ever given on the real estate 
described except the mortgage 
existing at the time of the sale. 
The waiver, if any, would only 
be the extent of the mortgage 
made and would not take effect 
unless the mortgage was in fact 
made." (citing authorities) 
The court cited Jones on Liens, Vol. II, 
paragraph 1079, as saying that if a mortgage 
had been given the "lien will still attach 
to the equity of redemption of the vendee, 
and upon the surplus." 
In Patton v. Meddick, 122 S. 710, 
97 Fla. 1073, the court thus refers to 
the vendor's lien at page 711: 
"It is a right given to the 
vendor of land who has conveyed 
title and reserved no lien nor 
taken security for the purchase 
price other than the grantee's 
personal obligation where the 
rights of others are not injured 
and it is equitable to sustain 
the lien. Even where the vendor 
knew that the purchaser borrowed 
money to make a payment and gave 
a mortgage to secure the loan, 
such transaction does not destroy 
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or waive the vendor's lien 
where no conduct of the vendor 
causes a waiver. Even where by 
direction of the purchaser the 
title is conveyed to another, 
the vendor's lien follows the 
land without any special agree-
ment." 
In McGreevy, et al. v. Constitution 
Life Insurance Co. (District Court of 
Appeals), 47 Cal. Rptr. 711, the court 
considered the persistence of a vendor's 
lien in a complicated sale involving part 
cash, a promissory note, part out of oil 
royalties and part out of stock to be sold 
from a public offering, followed by an 
agreement for production of part of the 
price from a mortgage of the oil and gas 
:eases involved. The court proceeded on 
the assumption that the vendor's lien is 
presumed to exist and that the vendee has 
the burden of showing that the vendor intended 
to waive his lien: 
"Upon the transfer of title of 
-16-
any real property, the seller 
has a vendor's lien for so 
much of the price as remains 
unpaid. (Civ. Code, paragraph 
3046.) A bona fide purchaser 
or encumbrancer for value takes 
precedence over the seller's 
lien. But, otherwise, the 
lien is good, u,nless it has been 
waived. (Citing cases) A 
waiver may be affected without 
the observance of any particular 
formality. But the burden of 
proof is upon anyone who claims 
that a waiver has taken place. 
Any action which shows an intent 
by the seller to waive the vendor's 
lien, such as taking independent 
security for the payment of the 
balance due for the land, or 
entering into an agreement which 
shows by its terms that the 
seller desires to waive the lien, 
is sufficient to establish the 
right of later lien holders to 
rely upon their security as 
prior to the vendor's lien." 
A case similar to the case at bar 
was Johnson v. Fugate (Okla. 1956) 293 
P.2d 559, 55 ALR 2d 1115. A parcel of 
land was sold for $8,000.00 of which $6,000.00 
was produced by a mortgage given by the 
purchaser following the giving of the deed 
by the vendor, which deed made no reference 
-17-
lien. The question before 
was whether the vendor's lien 
surviv8d the deed and the mortgage and 
prior to the mortgage. The District 
court held that the vendor's lien was prior 
to the mortgage, which decision was reversed 
by the Oklahoma Supreme Court which decreed 
that the defendant's mortgage lien was 
"prior and superior to the lien asserted 
by ?laintiff for the unpaid balance of 
the purchase price." (Page 1118) This 
case in 55 ALR 2d is followed by an annotation 
at page 1119 considering "priority as between 
vendor's lien and mortgage or deed of trust 
to third person furnishing purchase money." 
The conclusion of the annotation is that 
priority depends on the circumstances of 
each particular case, but all recognize 
that the vendor's lien survives the giving 
of a mortgage to the purchaser which furnishes 
part of the purchase price. 
-18-
CONCLUSION 
Respondents submit that Utah recognizes 
a vendor's lien which survives the giving 
o: a warranty deed. The authorities hold 
generally that such a vendor's lien persists 
when the purchaser mortgages the property 
and uses the proceeds to pay part of the 
purchase price. The question of priority 
as between Zions First National Bank and 
the vendor does not arise in this case, 
since the vendors concede priority to the 
ffiOrtgage. 
The conduct of the Polleis has 
been consistent only with the maintenance 
of the lien and in the conduct of their 
litigation they have carefully preserved 
the claim of lien and at the same time 
have preserved for these defendants a possible 
cause of action against the original purchasers 
who became judgment proof or under their 
-19-
(Tr. 54) 
The court is urged to grant a 
from its decision of January 
2c .:;.n view of the nonwai ver of the vendor's 
lien is shown by the pleadings in 
the Wurst action now brought before the 
court and before the District Court by 
consent of all the parties. The claim 
of waiver was not urged in the District 
Court, presumably because the facts showed 
there had been no waiver. The matter 
of waiver was not urged upon this court 
by appellants and for that reason the file 
the Wurst action was not previously 
made available to this court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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